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Watershed and Water Quality Protection
in National Forest Management
by TONY ARo*
The United States Forest Service manages about 191 million acres of
federal land, containing much of the nation's commercial timber, primar-
ily in the western United States.' The lands under its authority also in-
clude a vast array of watercourses, streams, rivers, lakes, and
watersheds 2 that are important sources of water for agricultural and ur-
ban uses throughout the West. Many of the rivers in the federal wild and
scenic river system 3 run through national forest land. A major part of
the Pacific salmon and steelhead population spawn in streams in the na-
tional forests and are dependent on the Forest Service's protection of
their spawning grounds.
4
Many controversial management practices of the Forest Service ad-
versely affect watersheds and water quality. These practices include
clearcutting, excessive timber harvesting, excessive roadbuilding, and
overgrazing.5 Groups opposing these practices have challenged them
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),6 which requires
federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for actions
* B.A. 1983, University of California, Berkeley; Member, Third Year Class.
1. M. FROME, THE FOREST SERVICE 71-73 (2d ed. 1984).
2. A watershed is the land surrounding a stream or river that collects the rainwater that
feeds the stream or river. Activities within the watershed of a stream can affect drastically the
flow and quality of the stream. If a watershed is made up of steep slopes that are deforested,
for example, subsequent storms will erode the soil on these slopes and cause the stream to run
muddy. In its natural forested condition, the root system and protection of the trees would
prevent substantial erosion. A deforested and eroded slope also will contribute to floods be-
cause it lacks the ability to hold rainwater. D. ALLARDICE, G. RADOSEVICH, K. KOEBEL &
G. SWANSON, WATER LAW IN RELATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 137-40 (1974)
[hereinafter WATER LAW].
3. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
4. M. FROME, supra note 1, at 164.
5. See supra note 2 for the effects of clearcutting and timber harvesting. Road building
often results in the deposit of sediment into streams and increases the likelihood of landslides.
WATER LAW, supra note 2, at 140-42; see National Wildlife Fed. v. United States Forest Serv.,
592 F. Supp. 931, 934-35 (D. Or. 1984). Overgrazing destroys plantlife that preserves soil and
hence causes erosion and sediment deposits. See Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource
Planning in the National Forests, 64 Or. L. Rev. 1, 7, 14 (1985).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988).
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that will have a significant effect on the environment. 7 Although NEPA
has been effective in delaying and sometimes stopping Forest Service ac-
tions, 8 it has two drawbacks for those who contest Forest Service man-
agement decisions. First, it imposes only procedural requirements on
federal agencies and not any substantive limits on actions that affect the
environment. Second, following a series of Supreme Court cases limiting
the statute, federal courts have become less willing to enjoin federal agen-
cies' actions that violate NEPA. 9
Congress attempted to deal with the controversy surrounding
clearcutting, overharvesting, overgrazing, and roadbuilding in the Na-
tional Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA).1° Senator Humphrey,
the NFMA's main sponsor, claimed it would "get the practice of forestry
out of the courts and back to the forests.""1 Some even claim that the
NFMA marks a new era in national forest management, by providing the
Forest Service with adequate guidelines to govern its controversial land
use practices. 12 This Note argues, however, that although Congress at-
tempted to defuse the controversy by mandating new procedural policies
for the Forest Service, the NFMA preserves the traditional independent
authority of the Forest Service to decide where and when to allow these
contentious practices. Section I of this Note examines the historical in-
dependence of the Forest Service and the extension of this tradition in
the NFMA. Section II argues that despite this statutorily mandated in-
dependence, other federal statutes concerning water quality and water-
shed protection may limit substantially the Forest Service's discretion to
engage in these controversial practices. Courts have begun only recently
to give attention to these statutes. Section III summarizes the existing
legislation that limits Forest Service authority through protection of for-
est ecosystems and noncommercial multiple-use values. It argues that
these statutes provide a foundation for further limits on Forest Service
actions that destroy these values.
I. The Forest Service's Tradition of Independence
To understand fully the present forest management controversy we
first must examine the genesis and development of the Forest Service.
7. Id. § 4322.
8. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988);
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.), stay denied, 97 S.
Ct. 347 (1976).
9. See Goldsmith & Banks, Environmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the
Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1983); Farber, Disdain for 17-Year Old
Statute Evident in High Court Rulings, 9 NAT'L L.J. May 4, 1987, at 20, col. 1.
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988).
11. 122 CONG. REC. S33,835 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
12. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 5, at 42-45.
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This section begins by exploring that history and the philosophy of its
most important figure, Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot.
A. Roots
The United States Forest Service was created in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.13 It is a child of the Progressive move-
ment's distrust of big business and unrestrained capitalism and belief that
government should be for the welfare of all-not just the moneyed and
powerful.1 4 Before the creation of the first national forests in 1891, there
was growing concern over the rapid deforestation of large parts of the
public domain and consequent damage to watershed and soil resources.1 5
Congress responded with the Creative Act of 1891,16 giving the President
authority to set aside forest preserves out of public lands. The Organic
Administrative Act of 189717 provided management authority and direc-
tion for these forest reserves. Under the Act, "[n]o public forest reserva-
tion shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within
the reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of
water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the...
citizens of the United States .... " The Act entrusted the protection of
the forest reserves to the Secretary of the Interior.1 8 It authorized the
sale of timber from forest reserves and established the method of sale of
timber, but gave no guidelines to the Secretary of Interior for managing
the forests. 19 This void is hardly surprising because the science of for-
estry was comparatively undeveloped. At the time, for example, there
were no schools of forestry in the United States.20
Eight years later, the Transfer Act of 1905 transferred the adminis-
tration of the forest reserves to the Department of Agriculture.21 Within
that department, the Division of Forestry (later renamed the Forest Ser-
vice) was permitted to develop its own management practices.22 Gifford
Pinchot, the first chief of the Division, immediately set about instituting
13. D. SMITH, THE FOREST SERVICE 6-32 (1930).
14. See R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 152-53, 160-63 (1967); see also D. STABILE,
PROPHETS OF ORDER, 57-59 (1984); M. FROME, supra note 1, at 12-14; see generally THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA (L. Gould ed. 1974).
15. See M. FROME, supra note 1, at 17.
16. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-
579, tit. VII, § 704(a), Oct. 21, 176, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (Oct. 1988
Edition; effective Jan. 3, 1989))
17. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34, 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-
482, 551 (1988)).
18. Id. at 35.
19. Id.
20. See 4 M. SULLIVAN, OUR TIMES 388 (1943).
21. Transfer Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288, § 1, 33 Stat. 628 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 472
(1988)).
22. D. SMITH, supra note 13, at 31-32.
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management practices according to the principles of conservationism, 23
of which he and his good friend President Theodore Roosevelt were
forceful advocates. 24 The principles Pinchot established guided the For-
est Service throughout its history.
25
Pinchot based his management practices on the ideas of utilitarian-
ism and scientific management. He wrote:
In the administration of the forest reserves it must be clearly borne in
mind that all land is to be devoted to its most productive use for the
permanent good of the whole people, and not for the temporary benefit
of individuals or companies. All of the resources of forest reserves are
for use, and this use must be brought about in a thoroughly prompt
and businesslike manner, under such restrictions only as will insure the
permanence of these resources. . . . [W]here conflicting interests must
be reconciled the question will always be decided from the standpoint
of the greatest good of the greatest number in the long run.
26
Pinchot's principles led to the management policies that came to be
known as "sustained-yield, multiple-use" management. 27 Congress ex-
plicitly recognized these policies in subsequent legislation.28 "Sustained
yield,"' 29 as stated by Pinchot, meant maximum use of the forests for the
good of the people, subject only to such restrictions "as will insure the
23. While the ethic of conservationism afforded more protection to the forest than existed
during the period of laissez-faire exploitation, it fell short of that envisioned in the preserva-
tionist goals of such pioneer environmentalists as John Muir. Muir, whose early friendship
with Pinchot soured as their philosophical differences became apparent, emphasized the spiri-
tual values of the national forests which he saw as "useful not only as fountains of timber and
irrigating rivers but as fountains of life." Muir, The Wild Parks and Forest Reservations of the
West, Atlantic Monthly, January, 1898, reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSER-
VATION IN AMERICA 292 (1972). Even in 1898, Muir warned that the nation's forest reserves
were being "sadly wasted and threatened on their more open margins by the axe and fire of the
lumberman and prospector, and by hoofed locusts [sheep]." Id. at 294.
24. J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1850-1909, 358-59 (1922).
25. See G. PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 260-62 (1947); Wilkinson & Anderson,
supra note 5, at 19-23.
26. G. PINCHOT, supra note 25, at 261. That this philosophy has persisted in the Forest
Service can be seen in the works of W.D. Hagenstein, a former Forest Service official, who
wrote:
Trees were placed here by higher laws than man's for serving the human race, and
they must continue to do so through protection, management and renewal, the prin-
cipal purposes of the forestry profession. [I]nherent in this canon of ethics is the
professional responsibility of protecting and managing forests, irrespective of owner-
ship, for the highest and best use of the greatest number of people.
Hagenstein, The Old Forest Maketh Way for the New, 8 ENVTL. L. 479, 494 (1978).
27. M. FROME, supra note 1, at 21-22, 76.
28. The Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 525-531 (1985). See
infra text accompanying note 40.
29. The meaning of this term has been the subject of debate. See, e.g., Behan, Political
Popularity and Conceptual Nonsense: The Strange Case of Sustained Yield Forestry, 8 ENVTL.
L. 309, 309 (1978) (" 'Sustained yield' is a slippery term.").
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
permanence of these resources." 30 This concept "recognizes fully the
right of the present generation to use what it needs and all it needs of the
natural resources now available, but it recognizes equally our obligation
so to use what we need so that our descendants shall not be deprived of
what they need."
'31
The principle of "multiple-use," although present from the begin-
ning, was less pronounced in the early days. 32 Early forest management
plans regulated grazing and timber harvesting in the interests of protect-
ing recreational spots, watersheds, and wildlife.33 A 1933 "National
Plan" emphasized that timber, watershed protection, recreation, wildlife,
and grazing were treated as multiple uses with all, or a combination of
them, applied in the same area.
34
During the period between the Transfer Act of 1905 and the 1950s,
the management role of the Forest Service was relatively uncontroversial.
The demands on the resources of the national forests rarely resulted in
competition between incompatible uses.3 5 Recreational use of the forests
was limited to a few scattered campgrounds, hunting was in scarce de-
mand, and the timber industry was marked more by depressed prices
than by the need for additional supplies. 36 This changed in the years
following World War II, as the growing demand for housing led to in-
creased demand for timber at the same time that recreational use of the
national forests first became significant. 37 The existing legislation gov-
erning the Forest Service threatened to prove inadequate. The timber
industry argued that the Organic Act of 1897 authorized the creation of
forest preserves only to protect watersheds and to insure a permanent
timber supply, and that the protection of recreational uses was, therefore,
beyond the authority of the Forest Service.38 There was no statutory au-
thority for the Forest Service's multiple-use, sustained-yield policy. The
Forest Service wanted legislation that specifically would authorize the
policies already being used to manage the national forests. 39
30. G. PINCHOT, supra note 25, at 261.
31. G. PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 80 (1910).
32. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 5, at 22-26.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 28 (citing FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, A NATIONAL
PLAN FOR AMERICAN FORESTRY, S. DoC. No. 12, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 81 (1933 & photo.
reprint 1979)).
35. D. LEMASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE 3-4 (1984). Timber stands were sometimes
withdrawn from harvesting in order to boost the price of lumber on private stands.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 5.
39. H.R. REPORT No. 1551, Apr. 25, 1960 [to accompany H.R. 10572], Pub. L. No. 86-
517, June 12, 1960, 74 Stat. 215, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2377, 2377-83. See also D. LEMASTER, supra note 35, at 5.
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B. The Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act
Congress responded in 1960 with the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield
Act (MUSYA),4° which defined the concepts of multiple-use and sus-
tained-yield and mandated that the national forests be managed by these
principles. The Forest Service drew up the definitions. 4 1 The Act defines
multiple-use as:
[M]anagement of all the various renewable surface resources of the na-
tional forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best
meet the needs of the American people; making the most judicious use
of the land for some or all of these resources or related services over
areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjust-
ments in use to conform to changing needs and conditions; that some
land will be used for less than all of the resources; and harmonious and
coordinated management of the various resources, each with the other,
without impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration
being given to the relative values of the various resources, and not nec-
essarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return
or the greatest unit output.
42
Sustained-yield is defined in MUSYA as "the achievement and
maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic out-
put of the various resources of the national forests without impairment of
the productivity of the land.
'" 43
The utilitarianism and flexibility of these definitions show that Con-
gress endorsed the tradition of an independent Forest Service, trusting its
professional judgment to turn broad philosophies into actual practice.
The legislative history of MUSYA indicates that Congress intended to
ratify the management practices that the Forest Service already had de-
veloped in pursuit of this task.44
Because MUSYA was framed in such broad terms and recognized
the major existing uses, 4 5 there was no serious opposition to it.46 Com-
mentators, however, dispute whether the Act's broad terms have limited
significantly Forest Service discretion and created judicially enforceable
standards. One commentator said that MUSYA does "not provide any
real legal standard by which to judge whether or not [its policies] are
being observed, especially for a specific land area such as a watershed.
' '47
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1985).
41. D. LEMASTER, supra note 35, at 6-7
42. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a).
43. Id. § 531(f).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2377, 2377-83. See also D. LeMaster, supra note 35, at 5.
45. "It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes."
16 U.S.C. § 528 (1988).
46. D. LEMASTER, supra note 35, at 7.
47. Id.
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Others have described it as a "collection of vacuous platitudes" 48 and a
"succotash syndrome." 49 By contrast, Professor Coggins has argued that
MUSYA "defines several judicially enforceable standards."50
The courts have treated MUSYA as providing only minimal limita-
tions on Forest Service discretion. A typical case is National Wildlife
Federation v. United States Forest Service. 51 Plaintiffs claimed that
clearcutting practices seriously affecting water quality and damaging fish
habitat violated the multiple-use provisions of MUSYA. The district
court stated that "[tihe standards in MUSY are broad, but they do exist.
MUSY is not entirely discretionary. [However,] Congress authorized the
Forest Service to decide which areas and resources to empbasize. As long
as the Forest Service considers the other competing uses, the courts are
reluctant to overrule its decisions."' 52 In the court's view, the Act re-
quires the Forest Service only to consider other uses and does not man-
date any minimum level of protection for any particular use, such as
watershed.
5 3
An extreme example of judicial deference to Forest Service discre-
tion is Sierra Club v. Hardin.54 The record, in Hardin states that six-
tenths of one percent of the Tongass National Forest in Alaska was re-
served from logging.55 The management plan for that area proposed the
clearcutting of ninety-five percent of the commercial forest land.5 6 In
Hardin, a district court held that the Forest Service still was acting
within the limits of its discretion, even though the evidence "undoubtedly
show[ed] the overwhelming commitment of the Tongass National Forest
to timber harvest objectives in preference to other multiple use values."'57
MUSYA was the governing legislation for the Forest Service for a
decade and a half, a period in which the Service became increasingly
controversial. In the mid-1970s, partly in response to this controversy,
48. Comment, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple Use System, 82 YALE
L.J. 787, 788 (1973) (authored by Christopher C. Curtis).
49. Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach to Forest
Land Management, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 473, 473 (1967).
50. Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple
Use, Sustained Yield"for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229, 231 (1982).
51. 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984).
52. Id. at 938.
53. See also Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (MUSYA's language
does not provide concrete limits on agency discretion and "breathe[s] discretion at every
pore." (quoting Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1979))); Zieske v. Butz, 406
F. Supp. 258, 259 (D. Alaska 1975) (no violation of MUSYA despite finding a violation of
Organic Act).
54. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971).
55. Id. at 122.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 123.
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Congress turned again to rewriting the Forest Service's statutory
authority.
C. The National Forest Management Act
Congress produced the National Forest Management Act of 1976
(NFMA),58 the next major piece of legislation governing the Forest Ser-
vice. The NFMA changed the procedural requirements that govern For-
est Service management practices. The supporters of the Act claimed
that it also included substantive standards and guidelines to ensure that
those practices would be environmentally sound. 59 To date, however, as
this Note will show, the NFMA has provided little more in the way of
substantive protection than the MUSYA.
(1) History
In part, the NFMA was a response to the Forest Service's concern
over two federal court decisions. Ironically, the two cases dealt with the
only provision of the old Organic Act 60 that already prescribed specific
procedures for forest management. In the first case, West Virginia Divi-
sion of the Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 61 plaintiffs chal-
lenged the Forest Service's contract calling for the clearcutting of a
section of the Monongehela National Forest. The court interpreted the
section of the Organic Act that provided:
For the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber and pro-
moting the younger growth on national forests, the Secretary of Agri-
culture... may cause to be designated and appraised so much of the
dead, matured or large growth of trees found upon such national for-
ests ... and may sell the same .... Such timber, before being sold,
shall be marked and designated .... 62
The court held that the language that limited harvesting to mature trees
and required marking before cutting precluded clearcutting. 63 The next
year, the District Court of Alaska adopted this interpretation in Zieske v.
Butz. 
64
The Forest Service expected the Izaak Walton decision to have enor-
mous significance on its management practices if applied nationwide. 65
It began to work on a legislative remedy. Instead of repealing the section
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988).
59. 122 CONG. REC. S33,835 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
60. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
62. Id. at 947 (quoting former 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed 1976)).
63. Id. at 948-50. Clearcutting is the practice of removing all timber in a given area,
rather than selecting trees to be cut. Id. at 946 n.2.
64. 406 F. Supp. 258, 259 (D. Alaska 1975).
65. D. LEMASTER, supra note 35, at 56-57.
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of the Organic Act that had triggered the problem, however, Congress
chose to remake substantially the Forest Service's statutory authority.
Congress first imposed new procedural and planning guidelines on
the Forest Service in the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974 (RPA).66 The RPA required the Secretary of Agri-
culture and the Forest Service to make periodic inventories of renewable
resources in the national forests and estimates of the demands for these
resources. 67 The President was to use these documents in making budget
requests for the Forest Service. 68 Congress intended to gain more control
over Forest Service management policies by requiring its budget requests
to conform to the needs predicted in these "Renewable Resource Pro-
grams" 69 or to explain the nonconformity. 70 The NFMA continued this
congressional policy by imposing new procedural requirements on the
Forest Service while preserving its independence in substantive areas.
(2) Provisions of the NFMA
The most significant change worked by the NFMA is the require-
ment that the Forest Service prepare a long range plan for each national
forest. The plans must detail the allowable uses of the renewable re-
sources of the forest, including the amount of timber to be harvested. 71
The Service is to develop these plans with public participation, and revise
the plans every fifteen years or as the Secretary of Agriculture finds
necessary. 7
2
In addition to these procedural requirements, the NFMA also con-
tains provisions expressly dealing with watershed and water quality pro-
tection. It explicitly reaffirms the principles of MUSYA.73 It requires
the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations specifying guide-
lines for the creation of forest plans that will "insure consideration" of
-the environmental aspects of renewable resource management, including
protection of watersheds. 74 The regulations also must ensure that timber
will be harvested from national forest lands only where "soil, slope or
other watershed conditions will not be irreversibly damaged. ' 75 Also,
the regulations must ensure that "protection is provided for streams,
stream-banks, shorelines, lakes, wetlands, and other bodies of water from
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (1988).
67. Id. § 1601.
68. Id.
69. The Renewable Resource Programs are to include inventories of expected needs,
levels of investment, and recommended development of renewable forest res6urces. Id. § 1602.
70. See D. LEMASTER, supra note 35, at 42.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
72. Id
73. Id. § 1604(g).
74. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(A).
75. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i).
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detrimental changes in water temperatures, blockages of water courses,
and deposit of sediment, where harvests are likely to seriously and ad-
versely affect water conditions or fish habitat .... -76
The NFMA provisions that regulate clearcutting are important for
watershed and water quality protection because of the detrimental effects
clearcutting can have on water resources.77 In response to the criticism
of clearcutting practices in the national forests, Congress adopted guide-
lines that require the Forest Service to follow a number of procedural
steps before allowing clearcutting. Such cuts must be carried out "in a
manner consistent with the protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife,
recreation, and aesthetic resources, and the regeneration of the timber
resource."7
8
Congress apparently intended to discourage the use of clearcutting,
but without restricting the Forest Service's discretion to use this tech-
nique in some situations. 79 The new guidelines also allow limited public
participation in deciding whether to clearcut.80 Like other NFMA pro-
visions, the guidelines for clearcutting emphasize procedural rather than
substantive protections for multiple-use values.81
(3) Significance of the NFMA
According to Wilkinson and Anderson, the NFMA changed the tra-
dition of congressional and judicial deference to Forest Service expertise
in the management of the national forests. "The NFMA... pushed deep
into the Forest Service's established autonomy. This is seen in the vari-
ous substantive restrictions, almost all of which revolve around timber
harvesting .... "82 These authors contend that "[b]y abandoning its tra-
ditionally deferential role in national forest management, Congress also
implicitly redefined the role of the courts. ' 83 They note similar changes
in the area of watershed and water quality protection: "[S]ome of the
NFMA's most prescriptive provisions concern water quality."'84
The NFMA mandated wide ranging changes in the Forest Service's
procedures, particularly in the area of public participation. It is less
clear, however, to what extent the NFMA imposes substantive limits on
Forest Service authority over the water resources in the national forests.
76. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii).
77. See supra note 2.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v).
79. "The Committee expects the Secretary to hold the average size of clearcuts as low as
practicable." Id. S. REP. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6662, 6699.
80. Id. at 6698-99.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(iv) (1988).
82. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 5, at 371.
83. Id. at 72.
84. Id. at 222.
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There was no consensus on this point at the time the Act was passed.
For example, Senator Randolph of West Virginia, who sponsored a com-
peting, more restrictive bill believed that the NFMA
failed to adequately cope with the issues involved in the continuing
controversy surrounding management of this Nation's national forest
lands. There were only two major provisions with any substance in the
Senate version-the multiple-use, sustained-yield and the marginal
lands provisions and they were substantially altered which rendered
them virtually meaningless in the conference passed bill .... [T]his
legislation will be the subject of intense litigation. We provided the
Forest Service with the complete authority to harvest timber in any
manner it desires with little or no protection for soil, nutrients, aesthet-
ics, wildlife, watershed protection, or slope condition. We have rele-
gated the multiple-use concept to a secondary position while placing
timber harvest on a pedestal.
8 5
By contrast, Randolph's bill would have identified the lands on
which timber could be sold with an eye toward conservation of water and
other resources.86 It would have banned clearcutting in certain eastern
forests and set rigid limits on the practice in other areas. There were also
separate provisions for ecosystem, soil, fish, and wildlife protection.
8 7
Some commentators also have failed to find enforceable standards in
the NFMA. Professor Behan, for example, has stated:
the National Forest Management Act... contains a statutory charge,
not "enforceable standards." The charge might be formulated this
way: "do good things with the national forests." Congress must rely on
the professional expertise of the Forest Service to decide what those
good things will be .. .. 88
Behan concludes, "I do not think we need better 'enforceable standards'
and I am happy to say that the National Forest Management Act...
[does] not provide them."' 8
9
Judging by the cases litigated since the passage of the NFMA, the
Act's substantive provisions for watershed protection (including the
clearcutting guidelines) will hardly limit Forest Service discretion any
more than the MUSYA prohibition on "impairment of the productivity
of the land." 90
Though courts have not yet applied the clearcutting guidelines of
the NFMA, they have applied their predecessors, the so-called "Church
guidelines." 91 Under the NFMA, the Church guidelines were enforcea-
85. 122 CONG. REC. S33,838 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
86. Pub. L. No. 94-588 [S. 3091] Oct. 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988)).
87. Id.
88. Behan, supra note 29, at 339.
89. Id. at 338.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 531. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
91. Named after the Senate committee that created them, which was chaired by Senator
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ble during the period of incorporating the Act's standards into forest
management plans. 92 The Church guidelines, which were substantially
similar to those in the NFMA, placed only vague limits on Forest Service
discretion in clearcutting decisions.
Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland 93 was the first
case to hold that Congress intended the Church guidelines to be enforce-
able against the Forest Service until management plans incorporating the
NFMA standards were completed. Environmental group plaintiffs had
secured an injunction in the district court against clearcutting in the East
Texas National Forests.94 The Fifth Circuit overturned the injunction.95
Although the court recognized that "[b]oth the Church guidelines and
the NFMA express serious reservations about the practice [of clearcut-
ting] that may not be disregarded by the Forest Service in developing
Church. The Church guidelines were published in STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC
LANDS 92D CONG., 2D SESS, CLEARCUTTING ON PUBLIC LANDS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS (March 1972). They provided as follows:
2. Harvesting limitations
Clear-cutting should not be used as a cutting method on Federal land areas
where:
a. Soil, slope or other watershed conditions are fragile and subject to major
injury.
b. There is no assurance that the area can be adequately restocked within five
years after harvest.
c. Aesthetic values outweigh other considerations.
d. The method is preferred only because it will give the greatest dollar return
or the greatest unit output.
3. Clear-cutting should be used only where:
a. It is determined to be silviculturally essential to accomplish the relevant
forest management objectives.
b. The size of clear-cut blocks, patches or strips are kept at the minimum nec-
essary to accomplish silvicultural and other multiple-use forest management objec-
tives.
c. A multidisciplinary review has first been made of the potential environmen-
tal, biological, aesthetic, engineering and economic impacts on each sale area.
d. Clear-cut blocks, paths or strips are, in all cases, shaped and blended as
much as possible with the natural terrain.
4. Timber sale contracts
Federal timber sale contracts should contain requirements to assure that all pos-
sible measures are taken to minimize or avoid adverse environmental impacts of tim-
ber harvesting, even if such measures result in lower net returns to the Treasury.
92. This was provided by the Conference Committee report on the NFMA, S. REP. No.
94-1335, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (conf.) at 24, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6662, 6726. The binding authority of the Church guidelines was recognized in California v.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 775 (9th Cir. 1982); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland,
573 F.2d 201, 209-10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
United States Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984).
93. 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
94. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp. 1235, 1254 (E.D. Tex.
1977).
95. 573 F.2d at 212.
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permanent guidelines," 96 it held that "[t]he development of those man-
agement policies remains the province of the Forest Service, subject to
the restrictions placed on it by Congress. A decision to pursue even-aged
management as the over-all management plan under NFMA is subject to
the narrow arbitrary and capricious standard of review."' 97 So despite
the prescriptive language of the Church and the NFMA guidelines, the
Forest Service has retained discretion to practice clearcutting and even-
aged management as long as its decision is not merely arbitrary and
capricious.
National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service 98 in-
volved a more direct claim that a Forest Service clearcutting plan vio-
lated the Church guidelines. The plaintiffs invoked a number of specific
sections of the guidelines to challenge Forest Service timber sales in an
Oregon national forest. They claimed that the clearcutting accompany-
ing the sale would seriously injure fisheries within the forest.99 This
would violate the requirement that clearcutting be carried out in a man-
ner consistent with protection of water resources and fish habitat.I°0 The
plaintiffs also claimed that this particular clearcut was not silvicultur-
ally I° I essential, as the Church guidelines required.10 2 This provision in
the guidelines was intended to address the concern of environmental
groups that the Forest Service tended to authorize clearcuts because they
are the most profitable method of timber harvesting, not because they
would best implement the multiple-use, sustained-yield policy.
0 3
The district court recognized that "the Church Guidelines are the
outer boundary of the Forest Service's discretion and are judicially en-
forceable." 1 4 The court held, however, that the plaintiffs' evidence was
insufficient evidence to show that the clearcut would cause serious injury
to fisheries or other natural resources. I05 The court reached this decision
despite substantial evidence of the destructive effect of past clearcuts in
96. Id.
97. Id. "Even-aged management" is the management practice accompanying clearcut-
ting. After a clear cut, new timber growth will all be of the same age. M. 1ROME, supra note
1, at 346.
98. 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984).
99. Id. at 938.
100. Id. at 936. The equivalent provision of the NFMA is at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v)
(1988).
101. "Silviculture" is the management of trees to produce the highest amount of harvest-
able timber. B. HAHN, J. POST & C. WHITE, NATIONAL FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
263 (1978).
102. Cf the NFMA equivalent at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)(3)(F)(i) (1988) ("clearcutting is de-
termined to be the optimum method").
103. See D. LeMaster, supra note 35, at 18-19.
104. 592 F. Supp. at 937.
105. Id. at 938.
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these forests on fish life, soil, and water resources.1 0 6 The court accepted
the Forest Service's assumption, expressed in an environmental impact
statement, that mitigation measures would be effective. 107
On the second count, the court accepted the Forest Service's finding
that the clearcut was silviculturally essential:
[The Forest Service] has evaluated the available silvicultural methods
for every timber sale and has concluded that clearcutting is essential.
The Forest Service has not violated this particular Church Guideline.
The Forest Service has special expertise in this area, and its determina-
tion of what is silviculturally essential is entitled to great weight.'
0 8
The court here, as in Bergland, treated the Church guidelines as allowing
the Forest Service a wide range of discretion within congressionally man-
dated boundaries.
Other cases dealing with watersheds and water quality also demon-
strate the discretionary standards of the NFMA. In Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson, 109 for example, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that construction of a pro-
posed road could cause significant slope failures and slope loss. This
would have major consequences on the water of Blue Creek in Northern
California.110 The district court found that debris from landslides trig-
gered by the road construction "would result in as much as a 500% in-
crease in the sediment loads in Blue Creek.""' The court, however,
treated the NFMA provisions as broad policies to be followed, rather
than as prescriptive standards."t 2 The court noted that "[1]ike the Multi-
ple Use, Sustained Yield Act, the NFMA requires that national forest
lands be managed with due consideration given to environmental values
.... Here, the balancing of competing values struck by the Forest Ser-
vice ... was not so insensitive to environmental concerns that it violates
the NFMA.""
13
The NFMA reflects Congress' historical commitment to permit the
Forest Service the power to balance the competing claims on forest re-
106. Id. at 934-35, 937.
107. Id. at 938.
108. Id.
109. 764 F.2d 581, 585-587 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-458 (1988). In a part of its opinion not
discussed in this Note, the court of appeals held that the building of certain sections of the
proposed road would violate the first amendment religious rights of the Native American
plaintiffs by destroying portions of their sacred grounds. This was the only part of the opinion
appealed to the Supreme Court, which found no first amendment violations and reversed.
110. Id. at 587-88.
111. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 600
(N.D. Cal. 1983), modified, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part sub nom. Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
112. 565 F. Supp. at 606.
113. Id. This decision is particularly significant because it was affirmed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, which encompasses the states containing most of the national forest lands.
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sources as it sees fit. What Congress gives with one hand, however, it can
take away with the other. At times, Congress has shown a distrust of the
balancing approach in the management of public land and has created
substantive protections for certain resources.
II. Substantive Limits on Forest Service Authority Over
Watersheds and Water Quality
Despite the discretionary standards of the NFMA and Congress' de-
termination to preserve the Forest Service's flexibility of management, a
number of other statutes, not specifically aimed at the Forest Service,
have the potential to limit its discretion. These statutes generally are
intended to protect particular resources that the Forest Service manages
under its multiple-use mandate. The most significant are the Clean
Water Act 14 and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 15
A. The Clean Water Act
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association v. Peterson, 116
which demonstrates the discretionary nature of the NFMA standards,
also illustrates the effective limits on Forest Service discretion in the
management of watershed areas: the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act" 7 (also known as the Clean Water Act). The Clean Water Act
(CWA) allows states to set their own water quality standards and re-
quires federal agencies to comply with these standards. 118 This limita-
tion is important because many activities occurring in national forests
affect watersheds and water quality. Particularly controversial are
clearcutting, roadbuilding, and grazing.
The Northwest Indian case concerned a proposed road and timber
harvest plan in the Blue Creek unit of the Six Rivers National Forest. 19
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin these projects on a number of grounds,
including a contention that it would violate the CWA. 120 In California,
water quality standards are set by Regional Water Quality Boards.' 2 '
The district court found that the proposed actions would violate two of
the North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board's standards: the
114. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988)
115. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988)
116. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983), modified,. 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
117. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
118. Id. §§ 1313, 1323. See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 564 F.2d
573, 575-76 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing the roles of the state and the federal administrator).
119. 565 F. Supp. at 590
120. Id. at 590-91.
121. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13170, 13240-41 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
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requirements that turbidity122 not be increased more than twenty percent
above naturally occurring levels 123 and that the sediment load not be al-
tered so as to create a nuisance or adversely affect beneficial uses. 124 The
beneficial use affected was the habitat and spawning grounds of anadro-
mous fish. 
125
On appeal, the Forest Service did not contest these findings, but ar-
gued instead that it was not bound by the Board's standards. 126 This
argument took two forms. First, the appellant claimed that because Cali-
fornia and the Environmental Protection Agency had accepted the For-
est Service's Best Management Practices (BMP), 127 which were
established to assure compliance with the CWA, the BMP superseded the
state imposed standards. 128 The court held, however, that state acquies-
cence in approving the BMP did not substitute the practices for the stan-
dards mandated by the CWA, but that the BMP served as guidelines in
the effort to meet those standards. 129
The Forest Service also argued that because the CWA requires state
plans to include procedures and methods to control silviculturally related
pollution and the BMP met these procedural requirements, the Service
was absolved from meeting the more specific standards. 130 The court
rejected this argument, stating that "[it] is but a variation of the one
before and fails for the same reason. Adherence to the BMP's does not
automatically ensure that the applicable state standards are being
met."131
Northwestern Indian recognized that citizens' groups could sue the
Forest Service to enforce state water quality standards as long as they
can otherwise meet federal standing requirements. Even more important
is the potential effect of the case on Forest Service independence in deci-
sions that affect water quality and watershed conditions. Any activity
affecting water quality will have to be within the limit on water quality
122. The amount of suspended solids in the water. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING
WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 15 (1968).
123. Compare this with the 500% increase in sediment loads that the district court in the
same case found not to be a violation of the NFMA. See supra note 111 and accompanying
text.
124. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 605.
125. Id. Anadromous fish are those, such as salmon and steelhead, that spend part of their
lives in the ocean and return to spawn in freshwater streams. B. HAHN, J. POST & C. WHITE,
supra note 101, at 252.
126. Northwest Indian, 764 F.2d at 588.
127. The BMP relating to watershed protection are found in a Forest Service handbook
and prescribe, for example, the point where a slope becomes to steep to allow timber harvest-
ing and the proper method to buttress roads so as to minimize landslides. See e.g., U.S. FOR-
EST SERVICE, FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, §§ 2522-25 (1986).
128. 764 F.2d at 588-89.
129. Id. at 588-89.
130. Id. at 589.
131. Id. at 589.
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disturbance set by state law. Since a state has the authority to make
water quality laws as strict as it likes, the CWA gives the states and local
authorities a much stronger tool to influence Forest Service decisions
than the NFMA requirement that the Forest Service consult with state
authorities when creating forest management plans.
132
The Ninth Circuit both clarified and confused its Northwest Indian
holding in a subsequent case, Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
United States Forest Service. 133 This case involved a timber sale in Ore-
gon accompanied by road building. Plaintiffs claimed that these actions
violated Oregon's state water quality standards, in particular the require-
ment that "existing high quality waters... shall be maintained and pro-
tected"' 3 4 and the prohibition of activities that "will cause . . . a 10
percent cumulative increase in natural streain turbidities."'
135
Rather than contest the substance of these claims, the Forest Service
argued that the applicable federal statutes did not entitle the plaintiffs to
bring this action. The court agreed that plaintiffs could not sue under the
citizen's suit provision of the CWA. 136 This provision applies only to
point source pollution; that is, pollution that can be traced to a specific
discharge point. Activities such as road building and timber harvesting
have a cumulative impact on water quality and are known as nonpoint
source pollution. 137
Nevertheless, the court allowed plaintiffs to sue for an injunction
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 138 The APA authorizes
parties harmed by a federal agency's action to seek judicial review of the
legality of that action. 139 Review is not available, however, if it is pre-
cluded by another statute or if the agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.140 The Forest Service argued that by including a citi-
zen's suit provision in the CWA, Congress implicitly precluded review
under the APA.141 The court rejected this argument and held that plain-
tiffs had a right to review under the APA.142 This clarified the grounds
upon which Northwest Indian was decided. In that case the Forest Ser-
vice did not challenge the plaintiff's right to sue and so the court did not
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1612 (1988)
133. 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 848 & n.6 (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 340-41-026(1)(a) (1986)).
135. Id. (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 340-41-445 (2)(c) (1986)).
136. Id. at 848-49. But see n.12 at 849 (Clean Water Act amended to include new provi-
sion dealing with nonpoint sources of pollution which provides grants and assistance to states
who develop programs to deal with nonpoint sources. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-4, § 316, 101 Stat. 52 (Feb. 4, 1987)).
137. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 850.
138. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988)).
139. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
140. Id. § 701(a).
141. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 834 F.2d at 848
142. Id. at 851.
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address which statute the plaintiffs were suing under. The plaintiffs orig-
inally alleged violations of both the CWA and the APA.143 In Oregon
Natural Resource Council the court concluded that its earlier decision
was based on the APA.144
The court, however, left a loose end by reserving "any opinion con-
cerning whether or not the matters involved preclude APA review be-
cause the matters constitute agency actions committed to agency
discretion by law." 145 Clearly the actions at issue in this case, timber
harvesting and roadbuilding, cannot be committed to the Forest Service's
discretion to the extent of violating state water quality standards. Not
only does the CWA prescribe agency adherence to state water quality
standards, but the federal regulations governing Forest Service actions
require all actions to be carried out in a manner consistent with these
standards. 146
The Clean Water Act authorizes the states to adopt regulations set-
ting standards for water quality. These standards must be approved for
compliance with the Act by the Environmental Protection Agency. 147 If
a state does not adopt standards, the EPA will set standards for that
state. 14 A state may, however, set water quality standards higher than
those required by the CWA. 1
49
California has divided the state into regions and delegated the crea-
tion of water quality plans and standards to regional control boards. 150
In setting these standards, the board may consider such factors as the
past, present, and future beneficial uses of water and the environmental
characteristics of each hydrographic unit or watershed. 151 Beneficial
uses include recreation, aesthetic enjoyment and enhancement of fish and
wildlife. 152 Within this range, regional boards have authority to set lim-
its on forest management practices that affect water. 153
The Northwest Indian case demonstrates the extent and nature of
the standards that the regional boards can establish. The boards can set
specific maximum levels of allowable disturbance and introduction of
foreign material; for example: "turbidity shall not be increased more than
143. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.
1985), rev'd in part sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988).
144. Id. at 851-52.
145. Id. at 852.
146. Parks, Forests and Public Property, 36 C.F.R. § 219.23(d) (1988).
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1982).
148. Id. § 1313(a)(3)(B).
149. Id. § 1313(a)(3)(C).
150. See Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283-84 (D. S.D. 1979).
151. CAL. WATER CODE § 13241 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 13050(f).
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20 percent ... .,,154 Other standards can be based on the effect of activi-
ties on specific beneficial uses, such as fish habitat and aesthetic enjoy-
ment, or use as a municipal water supply. Thus, the CWA sets definite
limits to Forest Service practices that go far beyond those of MUSYA or
the NFMA.
B. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
While the Clean Water Act is concerned mainly with protecting
water quality, another statute, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 155 is
aimed at protecting the aesthetic and recreational value of rivers that are
included in the wild and scenic rivers system. Rivers are included in the
system either through an act of Congress or by acts of state legislatures
that are approved for inclusion by the Secretary of the Interior.15 6 Inclu-
sion of a river that flows through federal lands imposes certain manage-
ment duties on the federal agency that manages those lands.
Management policies must be adjusted "as may be necessary to protect
such rivers in accordance with the purposes" of the Act.
1 57
Professor Gray has argued that the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
"can serve the ... purpose of enhancing the statutory protections for the
water resources-rivers, streams, aquatic life, watersheds, and riparian
habitat-of the national parks .... -158 A recent case shows that this
argument is equally applicable to the water resources in the national
forests. 159
Wilderness Society v. Tyrrel, 160 was the first case challenging Forest
Service management practices on the basis of the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Forest Service from carrying out an
intended timber harvest within the watershed of the south fork of the
Trinity River in Northern California.161 This section of the Trinity is
part of the wild and scenic rivers system. Plaintiffs claimed that the For-
est Service had not developed a management plan to protect the river and
that the proposed activities were likely to harm the values protected by
the Act.162 Defendants argued that the proposed activities were outside
the protected area of the river, relying on a section of the Act limiting the
154. Northwest Indian, 764 F.2d at 605.
155. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988).
156. Id. § 1272.
157. Id. § 1283.
158. Gray, No Holier Temples: Protecting the National Parks through Wild and Scenic
River Designation, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 551, 552 (1988).
159. Unlike forests, which are dedicated to multiple use, national parks are dedicated to
preservation and recreation. See id.
160. 701 F. Supp. 1473 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
161. Id. at 1475.
162. Id. at 1476.
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boundaries of a protected river to one-quarter of a mile on either side of
the high water mark.
163
The court found significant the fact that the Trinity River was desig-
nated for inclusion in the system through a state act. In the court's read-
ing of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the quarter mile corridor applied
only to federally designated rivers, and federal agencies could designate
broader protected corridors in carrying out their statutory duties under
the Act. 164 The court concluded that the federal agency could not use a
rigid boundary to avoid its management responsibility.165 The court
found that the Forest Service had violated its statutory duty to prepare a
management plan protecting the river.
166
More important, though, is the court's treatment of section 1283(c)
of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, which requires that the federal
agency charged with protecting a designated river cooperate with the En-
vironmental Protection Agency and state water pollution control agen-
cies in protecting the river. 167 The Forest Service received reports from
California Department of Fish and Game concluding that the proposed
activities would have severe detrimental effects on water quality and fish
habitat. 68 It also was aware of the EPA's opposition. The Forest Ser-
vice interpreted "cooperation" as "consultation."' 169 It further argued
that, as in Northwest Indian, the EPA's acceptance of the Best Manage-
ment Practices showed that the Forest Service had complied with section
1283(c), even though the EPA opposed the project on the whole. 70 By
granting the injunction, the court rejected this interpretation. In the
court's opinion, the Forest Service, by arguing that it need only acknowl-
edge other agencies' objections to its actions, was "again implicitly con-
verting to a discretionary standard a requirement that is compelled by
federal statute."'
7'
Under this interpretation of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the
Forest Service must comply with the recommendations of the EPA and
state water pollution control boards on actions that potentially may af-
fect designated rivers. If other courts adopt this interpretation, state
agencies will have substantial power to limit Forest Service action, and
third parties will be able to enforce these limits. This would limit Forest
163. Id. at 1485 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1276 (1988)).
164. Id. at 1486.
165. Id. at 1485-86.
166. Id. at 1489.
167. 16 U.S.C. § 1283(c) (1988).
168. The reports concluded that the proposed activities would have "[s]ubstantially in-
creased erosion in South Fork drainage, severely impacting the drainage's salmon and steel-
head resources for many years to come." Wilderness Society, 701 F. Supp. at 1488.





Service discretion in deciding to conduct or allow a wide range of activi-
ties in areas where they might affect water quality on these rivers.
III. What Is a Forest?
Congress is unlikely to make any major revisions in the NFMA.
Over the past decade, the Forest Service has committed considerable re-
sources to developing long-range forest management plans under the
NFMA. 172 Senator Humphrey's prediction that the NFMA would get
the Forest Service "out of the courts" 173 has proven to be a forlorn hope,
perhaps inevitably, given the incompatibility of the competing interests.
Those contesting Forest Service actions continue to use the National En-
vironmental Policy Act. Although the NFMA standards are discretion-
ary, other federal statutes place certain substantive limits on Forest
Service discretion. 174
A. The Meaning of Multiple Use
One protective statute, for example, that is fundamentally antitheti-
cal to the multiple-use principle that theoretically underlies the manage-
ment of national forests is the Wilderness Act of 1964.175 This Act
requires the Forest Service to manage designated wilderness areas in -a
manner that preserves their wilderness character, that is, to allow them
to remain essentially undeveloped. 176 By this Act, Congress mandated
that certain areas of the national forests be managed exclusively for one
use, rather than for multiple-use. This policy reflects congressional dis-
trust of the ability of the Forest Service to protect adequately wilderness
values as part of its multiple-use mandate.
Statutes such as the Clean Water Act, on the other hand, while pro-
tecting one of the resources of the national forests, are consistent with the
multiple-use principle. This is also true of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA),177 which requires the Forest Service to avoid actions that jeop-
ardize the continued existence and habitat of recognized endangered spe-
cies. 178 These statutes ensure that the Forest Service will continue to
follow the spirit of the multiple-use, sustained-yield principle. So far,
even the Forest Service's supporters have admitted that it is slanted to-
ward the timber production aspect of its mandate. 179 All these stat-
172. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 5, at 7, 14.
173. See supra note 11.
174. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988).
175. Id. § 1131.
176. Id. §§ 1531-1543.
177. Id. § 1536
178. See e.g. M. FROME, supra note 1, 4-6.
179. Another statute that may provide additional environmental protections in some areas
is the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988). The Supreme
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utes' 80 focus on the national forests as ecosystems, as well as collections
of resources. Although this focus is obvious from the language of the
ESA, the CWA also recognizes that actions within the forests will reso-
nate throughout the local ecosystems.1 81 The CWA thus protects water
quality as it relates to the habitat of fish and wildlife and prohibits a wide
range of activities that affect water quality.
These statutes provide a foundation for further controls on Forest
Service discretion in three ways. First, their substantive guidelines and
third party enforcement provisions strengthen the voice of groups seek-
ing to influence the creation and revision of forest management plans
through the public participation process. Such groups should recognize
that most large scale projects within the national forests have the poten-
tial to affect the noncommercial multiple-use values protected by these
statutes.
Second, in the Clean Water Act and the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, Congress has given the states power to limit Forest Service discre-
tion through water quality regulation that may be stricter than that re-
quired by the EPA. If the Forest Service jeopardizes the health of a
state's river system by an overemphasis on resource extraction, the state
may strengthen its regulations through the legislative process.
Finally, these statutes provide a precedent for removing the protec-
tion of certain multiple-use values (generally, noncommercial ones) from
the Forest Service's independent authority. In the future, they may help
to persuade Congress that other resources essential to the health of the
national forests' ecosystems, such as the dwindling old-growth forests,
also require additional protective legislation.
B. Final Considerations
In a more fundamental sense, the NFMA, as interpreted by courts,
conflicts with the network of protective statutes Congress has enacted to
protect noncommercial forest resources. The philosophy of multiple-use
implicit in the NFMA treats the national forests as a collection of dispa-
rate resources. Under this view, management decisions are made by bal-
ancing resources against each other on a utilitarian basis. As long as all
uses are merely considered in the balance, a management practice heavily
favoring one use can be justified. 182
Statutes like the CWA and the ESA embody an alternative theory of
multiple-use. This theory views the forest as an interconnected system in
Court in California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 584-89 (1987), held
that state environmental regulation enacted under the authority of the CZMA is not pre-
empted by the NFMA.
180. See supra notes 116-54 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 51-57, 93-113 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 42.
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which the various resources cannot be pitted against one another. Em-
phasizing one use may threaten all others. This view seeks not to balance
independent factors in a utilitarian calculus, but to find a balance that
protects each use, commercial or noncommercial.
This apparently inconsistent federal legislation is not necessarily to
blame for the Forest Service's inability to keep "out of the courts and
back to the forest." The NFMA is broad enough to allow management
practices based on the alternative view of multiple-use. In interpreting
its broad legislative mandate, the Forest Service should be guided by the
policies that shaped the statutes discussed in this Note.
Conclusion
For years, the Forest Service enjoyed independence in managing the
national forests and their water resources as it saw fit. The substantive
judicially enforceable limits on this independence are just now becoming
apparent. These limits, however, are found not in the National Forest
Management Act, but in a variety of other federal statutes. Congress
intended the NFMA to allow the Forest Service flexibility and wide dis-
cretion in exercising its professional expertise within the broad multiple-
use, sustained-yield principles. At the same time, by passing these other
statutes, Congress expressed its distrust of the Forest Service's ability to
protect certain multiple-use values. This Note has examined how two of
these statutes, the Clean Water'Act and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
place substantive limits on Forest Service authority. Other multiple-use
values are protected in the Wilderness Act, the Endangered Species Act,
the Coastal Zone Management Act, and others. In the future, these stat-
utes probably also will prove to include limits on Forest Service authority
unrecognized so far.
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